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Court-Ordered Sanctions of Attorneys: A




Recently, some judges have responded to the problem of attor-
ney misconduct by issuing sanctions against offending attorneys.'
This practice threatens to alter radically the essence of the attorney-
client relationship, the practice of law, and the manner in which
cases are litigated. In addition, it alters the necessary equilibrium
between counsel, the parties, and the judge in the conduct of a trial.
Ironically, attorney sanctions were initially imposed in order to re-
duce litigation; instead, they have produced extensive trial and ap-
pellate litigation.2 Some commentators have suggested that a rela-
tively small number of judges are responsible for a
disproportionately large number of sanction cases.' This supports the
contention that most judges are uncomfortable with the issue.4
This Article is not concerned with the sanctions imposed upon
an attorney for failure to respond to a motion within a specified
time.5 It does not question the power of a judge to hold an attorney
in contempt for specific conduct.' This Article addresses whether a
judge should have the power to punish the attorney and the litigant
for initiating the action. By utilizing this power, granted in the fed-
eral system by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 the
*Professor of Law, University of Baltimore, School of Law. ABML, Loyola College of
Maryland; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. Director, Hoffberger Center for Pro-
fessional Ethics, University of Baltimore.
I. "[A]ttorney sanctions have emerged as an increasingly significant aspect of civil liti-
gation in the United States." Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 344 (1989).
2. Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J 901, 901-02 (1988).
Federal courts issued over 1000 opinions dealing with Rule II in the five years following the
Rule's promulgation in 1983. Id. at 901. In Maryland, appellate courts addressed the applica-
tion of their analogous sanction rule, MD. R. Civ. P. 1-341, no less than six times in 1988.
3. Note, supra note 2, at 903.
4. id.
5. See, e.g., MD. R. Civ. P. 2-432, 2-433; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 27, 30(g), 37. See also
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey League, 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
6. See, e.g., MD. R. Civ. P. PI-PS.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. II. For the text of Rule 11, see supra note 35.
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judge can alter the result of the case by ordering remedies that are
as significant as any jury award.
This relatively unfettered power to sanction attorneys and their
clients for conduct prior to the commencement of litigation as well
as during the litigation creates a severe obstacle benefiting neither
the courts nor the practice of law, and is of little value to the public.
In federal courts, attorney sanctions affect plaintiffs four times as
often as defendants, 8 and there is every reason to believe that a simi-
lar disparity exists in state courts. This disparity suggests that the
system is skewed against plaintiffs.
The legal system enjoys credibility in part because the judge is
viewed as detached and objective, not only with regard to the subject
matter of the litigation, but also with regard to the litigators and
parties.9 Because the power to issue sanctions radically alters the
balance of power among the participants in litigation, it may cause
all participants to suspect that the process may not be as objective as
it seems.10 The judge is wary of the lawyer and feels obligated to
evaluate not only the merits of the matter, but also the attorney's
motives for presenting a given motion, argument, or document, to
determine whether the attorney's action is "frivolous."'"
Each lawyer fears opposing counsel, and they approach one an-
other as warriors, not as dignified professionals protecting the inter-
8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, SANCTIONS: RULE I I AND
OTHER POWERS I (2d ed. 1988).
9. The Supreme Court has suggested that the delay of litigation that results from discov-
ery abuse and other systemic faults leads to public "frustration with the federal courts and,
ultimately, disrespect for the law." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4
(1980). Roadway dealt with sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982), which permits federal
courts to assess excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees to "[any attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously .... " id.
10. See Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 75 Md. App. 214,
540 A.2d 1175, cert. denied, 313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988) (dynamics of the trial process
and response of the trial judge to the process can be viewed as bringing into question the
objectivity of the process and the fairness of the administration of justice).
II. For example, an attorney may be subject to sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. II for
filing a pleading that includes every possible theory of the case. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lincoln
Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
Sanctions may also be ordered if the judge determines that an attorney's summary judgment
motion is unjustified and misleading as to the state of the law. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), rehg denied en banc, 809 F.2d 584
(9th Cir. 1987).
Although it does not appear in the Federal Rules, the term "frivolous" is frequently used
to describe a class of cases that are brought in bad faith, without substantial justification, to
harass the defendant or abuse the legal process. Note, supra, note 1, at 350-51. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982) (no sanction if
appeal not frivolous); Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 122, 485 A.2d 270 (1988) (no sanction
for attempt to seek extension of existing law).
COURT-ORDERED SANCTIONS
ests of their clients and acting within ethical constraints. Clients may
also be sanctioned, 12 and this potential exposure gives the client the
right and the need to be involved in all phases of the litigation, in-
cluding procedural decisions that have traditionally been made by
the lawyer.' 3
Even more troublesome is the use of attorney sanctions as a
weapon. Judges threaten lawyers to secure desired results, such as
settlement, withdrawal, or action on a motion or pleading. Lawyers
threaten one another to force or prevent specific conduct. Perhaps
the most disturbing result is that clients believe that their legal posi-
tions cannot be vindicated for fear of sanction. As a result, all con-
cerned take a combative approach that is detrimental to the practice
of law and has a chilling effect on the litigation process. 4 One might
suggest that there will be no cause for concern for those who file
pleadings and motions that are not sanctionable. However, the sanc-
tion rules are so vague and subject to the latitude of judicial discre-
tion that, unless necessity demands otherwise, lawyers must take the
conservative approach in order to avoid provoking sanctions.' 5
12. Sanctions for litigation brought in bad faith may be applied both to counsel and to
litigants. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (dealing with 28
U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions); Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568
A.2d 856, cert.'denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990) (citing cases in which Maryland's
sanction rule, Rule 1-341, has been imposed upon litigants).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) comment (1983)
("[Tjhe lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues .... ).
14. In a recent Florida case, Muckerman v. Burris, 553 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989), vacated, No. 1009 (LEXIS, States library, Fla. file), the attorney filed an action on
behalf of his client to set aside certain deeds conveying real property. Id. at 1300. The defend-
ant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the client lacked standing. Id. The trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Id. With the trial court's permission, the
lawyer filed several amended complaints. Id. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the
amended complaints with prejudice, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. 553 So.2d
at 1300. The defendant then sought attorney's fees pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1987),
and the trial court ordered sanctions against the attorney and the plaintiff. Id.
The Florida District Court of Appeal could find no evidence to support the trial court's
finding that there were no justiciable issues. Id. at 1301. The court held that "when a party
engages in a good faith, soundly based, nonfrivolous, but unsuccessful attempt to change an
existing rule of law, attorney's fees are inappropriate." Id.
15. "Judicial legislation in the area of sanctions creates further confusion and impreci-
sion for the attorney and client. See A & M Grocery v. Frank Lopez, No. 89-394 (S.C. Ala.
June 8, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ala. file) (court used several synonyms, including
"groundless in fact or in law," "vexatious," and "frivolous" for the term "substantial justifica-
tion," none of which are direct synonyms for the phrase).
In a recent case, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited the Arizona statute regarding sanc-
tions, which provides, in part, that "'without substantial justification' means that the claim or
defense is groundless and is not made in good faith." Chavarria v. State Farm Mutual, No. I
CA-CV 88-392 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ariz. file). This statute
indicates that all three requirements are necessary to satisfy the definition of "without substan-
tial justification." The court stated, "Further, we cannot say that this appeal was prosecuted
for an improper motive or that any reasonable attorney would agree that it was totally and
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Some might suggest that this effect is entirely beneficial. These
sanctions were created to prevent frivolous litigation,' 6 reduce the
number of cases in court, 17 and, at least peripherally, to reduce the
prevalence of attorney antics occurring prior to and during the con-
duct of the legal proceeding. Clearly, attorneys do bring frivolous
cases having nothing to do with the protections and guarantees of
the legal system. 18 It is equally clear that some lawyers abuse the
legal system for purposes other than the promotion of justice or vin-
dication of their clients. 9 Although court-ordered sanctions are in-
tended to address each of these issues, it is far from certain that they
have had an impact on any of them. Moreover, the use of attorney
sanctions clearly carries serious, and very troubling harms that di-
minish the effectiveness and even the validity of the legal system.
The language of the sanctions statutes is not the only culprit; the
entire mechanism by which sanctions are determined and awarded is
also culpable. 0
completely without merit." Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear whether the term "totally with-
out merit" is a further clarification of the statutory definition, a new definition, or common law
language without any independent meaning.
16. A court may award attorney's fees as sanctions against a party who has acted in
"bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
17. Judge Cudahy stated the problem succinctly in Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen
Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988): "Rule II [has
changed] from a protector against frivolous litigation, a boon to the parties and the courts, into
a fomenter of derivative litigation, a mire for unwary parties and overzealous courts." Id. at
1085 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He added that our legal system is
now "in danger of creating a whole new cottage industry of sanctions." Id. at 1086.
18. See Wyatt v. Wehmeuller, 163 Ariz. 12, 785 P.2d 581 (1989). In Wyatt, the attor-
ney filed a motion for lis pendens that misrepresented the object of the action and the relief
demanded. The trial court ruled the motion groundless and stated that it contained a material
misstatement of the plaintiffs' actual claims. Interestingly, on appeal the plaintiffs sought to
distance themselves from their attorney by alleging that the attorney did not act with their
authority. The court dismissed this argument by stating that an attorney operates with both
actual and apparent authority. Id. at 27, 785 P.2d at 596.
19. "Rule I I requires lawyers to think first and file later, on pain of personal liability."
Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 1986).
20. See Maryland State Bar Association, Report of Joint Committee to Study Rules I-
311 and 1-341, at 2 (Sept. 1990), which provides:
Based on [the] survey and the Joint Committee's other efforts on this pro-
ject, it is the consensus of the Joint Committee, acting with the approval of the
involved Section Councils, that revisions should be made to the non-discovery
sanctions process as now defined by Maryland Rules 1-311 and 1-341, as
follows:
I. A hearing should be available for a party and/or their counsel being
considered for such sanctions.
2. Notice of any pending motion and hearing should, of course, be pro-
vided to the involved parties/counsel.
3. In the event that an award is sought or being considered against both
the parties and the attorney(s), the notice should identify the potential
conflict as between the parties and their counsel, to put the recipients on
COURT-ORDERED SANCTIONS
When the legal system loses the valuable and important balance
between the trier of fact and the litigants, the process is diminished.
It is further diminished when the trier of fact also judges the con-
duct of the participants in relation to the substance of the case and
in relation to his or her interpretation of the evidence coupled with
the conduct of the parties and counsel. The legal system is further
diminished when the litigants and counsel, both potentially subject to
sanctions, must present their case to a judge who has the authority
to order sanctions.
In our legal system, the lawyer is a partisan as well as an officer
of the court.21 Similarly, the mechanics of court-ordered sanctions
place the judge in a dual role. In addition to making appropriate
decisions regarding the subject matter of the litigation, the judge
notice that the parties and their attorneys may need separate counsel for
purposes of the hearing.
4. In the event the Court determines it is appropriate to enter sanctions,
there should be required findings of one of the four factors as a basis to
justify sanctions:
a. Bad faith; or
b. Lack of substantial justification; or
c. Irrational behavior; or
d. Gross negligence.
5. Additionally, in the event of the entry of such sanctions, the Court
should be required to make specific findings of fact as to the bases for the
sanctions award.
6. Provisions should be made for the Court to make a determination of
equivalent legal expenses, with particular reference to attorney's fees if
no actual fee has been incurred, as would be true in a contingent case.
7. Any sanction award entered should be limited to the expenses in-
volved in the specific litigation activity which is the subject of the ruling.
The concern of the Maryland State Bar Association over the meaning of the rule(s) and the
specific application of the sanction rule is responsive to the large number of sanction cases that
have occurred in Maryland, nearly all of which have resulted in appeals in which the judge
was found to have applied the sanction rule incorrectly.
21.
The first principle of conduct is the principle of neutrality. This principle
prescribes that the lawyer remain detached from his client's ends. The lawyer is
expected to represent people who seek his help regardless of his opinion of the
justice of their ends.
The second principle of conduct is partisanship. This principle prescribes
that the lawyer work aggressively to advance his client's ends. The lawyer will
employ means on behalf of his client which he would not consider proper in a
non-professional context even to advance his own ends. These means may involve
deception, obfuscation, or delay. Unlike the principle of neutrality, the principle
of partisanship is qualified. A line separates the methods which a lawyer should
be willing to use on behalf of a client from those he should not use. Before the
lawyer crosses the line, he calls himself a representative; after he crosses it, he
calls himself an officer of the Court. Most debates . . . concern the location of
his [sic] line.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 30, 36-37 (footnotes omitted).
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must also make qualitative decisions concerning the case itself and
the conduct of the participants.22 For the participants, this power
looms menacingly, much like the mythical sword of Damocles.23 For
the judge, it represents the power to accomplish by fiat what may or
may not be permitted by the appropriate rules.24
In addition, because there are no factual or formal due process
requirements controlling the award of sanctions,25 the result is a
free-wheeling system of punishment.26 Judges are using the anvil of
sanctions to kill the ant of attorney misconduct. Not only are sanc-
tions directed at the conduct of the trial and the substance of the
case, but they have been extended to limit the ability to use discov-
ery to move the plaintiff's case forward.27
No qualitative or quantitative evidence exists suggesting a body
of frivolous cases that would warrant this cavalier approach. If the
chilling effect of sanctions is not enough to cause concern, sanctions
also create a separate and parallel system of attorney discipline not
22. See supra note II and accompanying text.
23. Damocles was the 4th Century B.C. Courtier in the retinue of Dionysius, the Elder
of Syracus. The sword was suspended by a single hair over the head of Damocles, guest at a
banquet that was given by Dionysius c 367 B.C. This was done as a reminder of the insecurity
of a tyrant's happiness. WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2314 (1986).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. See. e.g., Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, 222 Cal. App. 3d 970, 272 Cal. Rptr. 126
(1990), in which the court was asked to interpret the California sanction statute because the
attorney who was sanctioned alleged that the due process requirements of the statute were
violated by the trial court's action. The court cited Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan,
169 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 215 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1985), in which the court stated that "its [stat-
ute's] purpose is to fulfill the 'rudiments' of due process both for due process' own, constitu-
tional sake and to ensure that the power conferred by the statute will not be abused." Cald-
well, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
26. Also illustrative of the lack of a structured sanction system is the failure of trial
courts to make specific findings or reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The sanctioned
individual neither knows nor understands the bases for the determination. See, e.g., Tidwell v.
Waldrop, 554 So. 2d 1009 (Ala. 1990) (Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the reasons for the award and for a redetermination of the
award). Contra Alpine Assocs. v. KP&R, Inc., No. 89CA0412 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Colo. file) (court determined that the trial court set forth adequate
reasons for the award of attorney's fees in accordance with the sanctions statute).
27.
Rule II is designed to insure that allegations made in a complaint drafted by a
member of the bar . . . are supported by a sufficient factual predicate at the
time that the claims are asserted. It is thus no answer to a motion seeking Rule
II sanctions . . . to suggest that plaintiffs needed discovery to ascertain whether
the claim asserted was well founded.
City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), later proceeding,
649 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 884 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
How else is a litigant to obtain sufficient evidence upon which to assert his claim without
the benefit of discovery, when the facts, witnesses, and papers are in the control of the other
party? Of course, there is no unlimited right to conduct such discovery, but the attorney must
be afforded some latitude to obtain the necessary facts through the discovery process. Cf. Col-
lins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 965 (1 lth Cir. 1987).
COURT-ORDERED SANCTIONS
governed by specific rules of professional conduct or subject to the
protections provided by the state grievance procedures.28
Attorneys and their clients can be summarily disciplined by the
award of economic penalties for conduct found wanting under the
amorphous standard of judicial discretion. Not only does the sanc-
tion process duplicate the attorney grievance procedure; it parallels
the state disciplinary regime because the award of sanctions does not
bar the application of the state grievance procedure to the same set
of facts. The award of economic sanctions in no way prevents, limits,
or diminishes the operation of the state grievance procedure or its
potential outcome.29 Furthermore, no formal rules limit when sanc-
tions may be applied to the offending attorney and the client.30
No basis exists to justify the duplication of the grievance proce-
dures and rules of professional conduct that already operate. This
dual approach creates problems not only because of its duality, but
also because the sanction approach is simply unworkable. The sys-
tem of attorney sanctions31 operates on the presumption that the par-
ticipant is liable for sanctions simply because the judge determines
that he is. 2 The result is neither just nor equitable, and has a nega-
tive impact upon the practice of law and the relationship between
the judge and counsel. 33 The need for parties to have meaningful
access to the courts outweighs the limited benefits achieved by re-
ducing the number of allegedly frivolous claims.
This Article addresses the operation of the sanction rules, and
discusses due process concerns raised by the sanction procedure. It
28. See, e.g., MD. R. Civ. P., BV I-BV 18.
29. See supra notes 136-73 and accompanying text.
30. But see Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 69
(3d Cir. 1988) (sanctions could not be applied to an attorney for failing to produce sufficient
evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment). See also Needle v. White, Mindel,
Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338
(1990), in which Maryland's intermediate appellate court overturned a post trial award of
sanctions against a plaintiff's attorney in a case that survived two summary judgment motions
and required a six hour jury deliberation.
Although these sanction awards were overturned on appeal, the mere fact that these attor-
neys had to litigate over their conduct is bound to create a chilling effect on future zealous
advocacy.
31. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; IOWA R. Civ. P. 80(a); MD. R. Civ. P. 1-341.
32. The judge determines what is frivolous and may impose sanctions tpon determining
that the case is "spiteful." Cavallary v. Lakewood Sky Diving Center, 623 F. Supp. 242, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
33. "[The judge's] discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exer-
cised in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office." Quercia v. United States,
289 U.S. 466, 470 (1932). Although this case discussed the danger that a judge's comments on
the facts during the trial could influence the jury, this observation could also be applied to the
imposition of attorney sanctions, a situation in which the judge must also remain neutral and
impartial.
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considers the parallel approach of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, concluding that the Model Rules' approach is appropriate
and sufficient to weed out attorney misconduct while protecting the
public and permitting meaningful access to the courts.
II. The Rules and Their Application
A. The Purposes of Sanction Rules
Attorneys and their clients are governed by state sanction
rules3 4 and by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 .5 Both the state
34. For example, the applicable Maryland rule states:
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintain-
ing or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justifica-
tion the court may require the offending party or the attorney advising the con-
duct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and
the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the
adverse party in opposing it.
MD. R. Civ. P. 1-341.
The applicable Illinois statute states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in act
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Smith-Hurd 1986). See also IOWA R. Civ. P. 80(a); PA.
R. Civ. P. 4019.
35. Rule I1, as amended in 1983, states:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attor-
ney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's
address . . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasona-
ble inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation . . . . If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in-
curred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. II.
Prior to the 1983 amendment to Rule II, sanctions were based on a subjective standard
and evaluated on the basis of good faith. The amendment replaced the good faith standard
with one based on "reasonable inquiry." See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1983
Amendment, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99 (1983). The result is a change from a subjective standard
to an objective one. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d
Cir. 1985), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
The application of the reasonable inquiry standard has generated a significant amount of
COURT-ORDERED SANCTIONS
and federal rules exist to prevent suits that are frivolous or brought
in bad faith. 6 In addition, cases brought to harass are also subject to
sanctions under Rule 11.11 Although the interpretative literature sur-
rounding these state and federal rules suggest that they were not
designed to create a chilling effect upon legitimate causes of action,"
the sanction rules have produced such an effect. In In re Marriage of
Laherty,39 the court observed that:
Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are
arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will
win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is not by
definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions. Counsel
should not be deterred from filing such appeals out of a fear of
reprisals. Justice Kaus stated it well. In reviewing the dangers
inherent in any attempt to define frivolous appeals, he said the
litigation exploring the parameters of the term. Each factual situation will require a different
level of "reasonable inquiry." Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 261
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
Courts consider a number of issues under the reasonable inquiry standard: the experience
of the attorneys who have filed the pleading, Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548,
557 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); whether the attorneys personally inter-
viewed the parties and witnesses, Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D.
Colo. 1983); the documents and physical evidence reviewed by the attorneys prior to filing the
pleading, Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324,
1326 (S.D. Fla. 1984); and whether counsel blindly followed the views of other attorneys
rather than conducting individual research and analysis, Home-Pack Transp., Inc. v. Donovan,
39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1063, 1066 (D. Md. 1984).
Counsel are also expected to make a reasonable inquiry into the law prior to filing a
pleading. When that inquiry is deemed not to be reasonable, the attorney is subject to sanc-
tions. See, e.g., Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536, 538 (N.D. Ohio
1984) (counsel failed to determine whether a right to a jury trial exists in sexual discrimina-
tion cases). Suits whose purpose is determined to be improper are also the subject of sanctions.
See, e.g., Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 101 (7th Cir. 1985) (frivolous claim brought in bad
faith). For factors in defining what is a "reasonable inquiry," see Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 988-90 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc, 822 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1987), rehg en banc, 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
36. "The terms of Rule 11 state that the signature of an attorney acts as a certificate
that the motion 'is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension . . .
of existing law and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose.' " Robinson v. National
Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1130 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
37. Id. at 1130.
38. "Rule II is 'not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity.' " Id. at
1131. As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals recently noted,
The objective of the Rule [Maryland Rule 1-341] is to fine-tune the judicial
process by eliminating the abuses arising from the tendency of a few litigants
and their counsel initiating or continuing litigation that is clearly without merit.
The inherent danger in the process is that over zealous [sic] pursuit of the objec-
tive may result in what the Court, in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2nd Cir. 1985), described as "stifling the enthusi-
asm or chilling the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law."
Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 470, 568 A.2d 856, 860, cert.
denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990).
39. 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982).
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courts cannot be "blind to the obvious: the borderline between a
frivolous appeal and one which has no merit is vague indeed
. . . ." Vague definitions of what constitutes a frivolous appeal
raise the danger that attorneys will be deterred from asserting
valid claims out of a fear that they will incur court sanctions.4°
Although sanctions may be awarded against both the attorney and
the client,"1 or to each separately, 42 the ultimate purpose of the sanc-
tion rule is to punish attorneys for failure to exercise control over the
litigation process. Sanctions are punitive, 48 and are severe so that the
court's intent will be perceived*clearly and future conduct will be
deterred." The court generally scrutinizes the attorney's conduct,
considering whether the lawyer acted "beyond the limits of reason or
the bounds of the law."'45 The court also determines whether the at-
torney should have inquired into possible limitations before filing the
action. 0
B. Sanctions and Judicial Hindsight
Even the most egregious attorney conduct does not warrant the
use of judicial hindsight to apply sanctions at the termination of the
proceeding. 7 This is overly burdensome to the attorney, and is not
the most effective means of addressing the attorney's conduct. Judi-
cial hindsight, like any post mortem review, is likely to find question-
able conduct. Moreover, if the case did not proceed in accordance
with the judge's views, judicial hindsight affords the judge one last
40. Id. at 650-51, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
41. See, e.g., Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., 686 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. I11.
1988) (client liable for sanctions for alleging fraud and perjury without good faith basis).
42. Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
43. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987). "Courts should be sensitive to the impact of sanctions on attorneys. They can be eco-
nomically punishing, as well as professionally harmful; due process must be afforded." Id. at
1280.
44. "The rule [Rule II] reflects a dual purpose: [compensation and] penalizing the of-
fender to achieve special and general deterrents." Schwartzer, Sanctions Under the New Fed-
eral Rule il-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1985). See, e.g., Fox v. Boucher, 794
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (court imposed double costs and attorney's fees as a sanction); Hale v.
Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986).
45. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 54, 312 N.W.2d 585, 606 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
46. . Wren v. Feeney, 176 II1. App. 3d 364, 531 N.E.2d 155 (1988). See also Wymer v.
Lesslin, 109 F.R.D. 114 (D.D.C. 1985), in which the court sanctioned the attorney for failure
to inquire into his client's citizenship with regard to diversity in a federal case. The client
revealed her true citizenship on the morning of trial and her revelation destroyed diversity. Id.
at 116.
47. Cf. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 478, 568 A.2d 856,
865, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990).
COURT-ORDERED SANCTIONS
chance to correct what he or she believes to be an erroneous result. 8
This correction process is generally directed against the attorney and
may be undertaken sua sponte by the judge or in response to a mo-
tion from opposing counsel.
A recent Maryland case illustrates the problems associated with
judicial sanctions. In Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill,49 the
trial judge ordered the payment of $143,117.14 in attorney's fees.
The judge ordered the client to pay $121,369.14, and her attorneys
to pay $21,748.00.50 The case arose when the client was accused of
embezzling funds from a law firm."1 Large sums of money were
found to be missing, and the firm's insurance carrier required the
filing of a police report. Shortly after the police report was filed, the
client was indicted. 52 The client was represented by a public de-
fender and was acquitted. She then retained Mr. Needle and sued
the law firm for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 53 The firm refused to comply with discovery re-
quests and repeatedly delayed the process, believing that the acquit-
tal had been incorrect and that the client had at least participated in
the theft even if she had not stolen the money herself.
54
The law firm moved for summary judgment, and an extensive
hearing on this motion preceded the trial. Both litigants presented
memoranda, exhibits, and excerpts from the testimony at the crimi-
nal trial.55 The law firm contended that it had probable cause to
justify accusing the client, that its conduct was not so outrageous as
to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the
client's action was really nothing more than a retaliation for the
48. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
The court observed that "Rule II should not impose the risk of sanctions in the event that the
court later decides that the lawyer was wrong." Id. at 1542. The court also suggested that the
judge should not be required to review the accuracy of every document filed, because it would
be a substantial waste of the litigants' time and money. Id.
Similarly, in Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988), one judge concluded that the trial judge should not be
forced to grade briefs, especially when the award of a "c" means not only that the party loses
the case, but also that the attorney loses his shirt. 823 F.2d at 1085 (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
49. 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990).
50. Id. at 465, 568 A.2d at 857.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 465, 568 A.2d at 857.
53. Id. at 466, 568 A.2d at 857.
54. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 466, 568 A.2d 856, 857,
cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990). The author interviewed the sanctioned
attorney who explained the case and the process. The sanctioned attorney also showed me the
discovery motions, opposing counsel's failure to respond, and the court orders requiring compli-
ance, some of which were not followed.
55. Id. at 466, 568 A.2d at 857.
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criminal charges.56 The trial judge denied the firm's summary judg-
ment motion, and the matter proceeded to trial. At the close of the
client's case, the law firm again moved for judgment. "7 After a thor-
ough hearing, the court denied the motion, concluding that there
were genuine issues of material fact. The court reasoned that the
jury could reasonably find that the firm lacked probable cause to
accuse the client; in addition, the client had presented evidence that
she had suffered emotional distress. 58 The judge restated for the rec-
ord the testimony of the client's psychiatrist concerning the impact
of the events on the client.
The law firm presented its case and then renewed the motion for
judgment.5 9 The court reserved its ruling, and submitted the matter
to the jury. The jury concluded that the law firm had a reasonable
belief that the client took the money and that the firm did not report
the matter to the police maliciously or with reckless disregard for the
truth.6" At the request of the law firm, and over the objection of the
client, the jury was also instructed to indicate whether it believed
that the client had stolen the money. The jury concluded that she
had not.6" Finally, the jury found that although the client suffered
emotional distress, it was not severe enough to rise to the level neces-
sary for a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress.62
After the jury rendered its verdict, the court scheduled a sanc-
tions hearing sua sponte. 63 Mr. Needle and his associate requested a
postponement to establish the specifics of the charges facing them
and to seek separate counsel, but the judge denied the postpone-
ment." ' The judge then filed an extensive memorandum imposing
sanctions and establishing post-trial findings of fact which, according
to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, "adopted the version of a
particular witness or witnesses over the testimony of others, or...
[was] contrary to the responses of the jury on the issues or ...
adopt[ed] a conclusion where more than one inference is presented
by the testimony."6 5 The appellate court reversed the award of sanc-
56. Id. at 466, 568 A.2d at 857-58.
57. Id. at 467, 568 A.2d at 858.
58. Id. at 467, 568 A.2d at 858.
59. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 468, 568 A.2d 856, 858,
cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990).




64. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 468 n.1, 568 A.2d 856,
859 n.I, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990).
65. Id. at 470, 568 A.2d at 859. The court added:
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tions and directed that the law firm pay its own costs.66
Even when the language of the sanction rule is clear, as in Fed-
eral Rule 11, its application can reflect a lack of clarity or consis-
tency. The 1983 amendment clearly changed the applicable standard
from one of good faith to "reasonable inquiry." 7 Courts are still un-
clear, however, as to how the new standard should be applied, or
whether to accept the modifications at all. In Estate of Bias v. Win-
kler,68 the court considered application of 28 U.S.C. section 192769
and Federal Rules 11 and 37. Without applying a specific rule, the
court noted: "Plaintiff's arguments to the district court were not friv-
olous. Even if plaintiff's arguments to the district court were frivo-
lous, the requisite bad faith is absent."7
Even if the attorney operates in good faith,71 or is responding to
the demands of the client 72 or exercising the client's right to a fair
trial,73 the attorney may be attacked with sanctions. This may occur
if the judge decides, based on judicial hindsight,74 personal animos-
ity, ego, disbelief of the witnesses or evidence, or for any other rea-
son, to take the law into his or her own hands. This may seem a
harsh indictment of the sanction system, but an award of sanctions
We note that the court allegedly talked to the jury off the record after the case
ended. Appellants obtained affidavits of several jurors relating to the testimony
of various witnesses who participated in the trial. Arguably, the role of the jury
ought to tend with its verdict. Satellite litigation is a matter that the court and
counsel should resolve without seeking the thought processes of the trier of fact.
Id. at 470 n.2, 568 A.2d at 859 n.2.
66. Id. at 474, 568 A.2d at 864.
67. See supra note 35.
68. 792 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1986).
69. See supra note 9.
70. Winkler, 792 F.2d at 861.
71. Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984) (mistaken failure to realize
diversity jurisdiction warranted sanctions).
72. Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985)
(sanctions assessed for bad faith, dilatory tactics, and frivolous, scandalous accusations).
73. In re Custody of Caruso, 185 I11. App. 3d 739, 542 N.E.2d 375 appeal denied, 545
N.E.2d 135 (II1. 1989) (attorney relied on client's oral assurances that facts existed and under-
took no inquiry).
74. "We think it erroneous to determine a lack of substantial justification [for initiating
an action] from the vantage point of judicial hindsight because hindsight, judicial or otherwise,
is always 20/20, irrespective of any astigmatism, foresight may suffer." Kelley v. Dowell, 81
Md. App. 338, 342, 567 A.2d 521, 523 (1990) (citing Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Bishop's
Garth Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175 (1988)). The court added:
According to the standard set forth in that case [Bishop's Garth], the trial court
was required to take evidence on the circumstances surrounding Judge Burns'
grant of the ex parte motion, and to determine whether the motion was substan-
tially justified at the time it was filed. The trial judge clearly did not limit his
inquiry to the point in time when [the attorney] filed the motion for ex parte
relief. Rather, he determined the lack of substantial justification for filing the
action in light of all of the evidence adduced at the trial on the merits.
Kelley, 81 Md. App. at 343, 567 A.2d at 523.
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may be equally harsh. The Needle court stated, "In short, there are
no winners, which underscores the necessity that counsel seek sanc-
tions only where a claim is clearly meritless and trial judges accept
the premise that Rule 1-341 'is an extraordinary remedy intended to
reach only intentional misconduct.'-"5
C. Sanctions and the Attorney
Clients may be and often are the subject of sanctions. Courts
rarely impose sanctions, however, upon a client without also sanc-
tioning the attorney. The focus of sanctions is on the attorney, but
the attorney often cannot avoid them and still pursue zealous and
effective representation." Once the attorney is engaged and the case
is filed, the matter is before the court. At that point, the attorney
cannot refuse to move the matter forward simply because the attor-
ney has doubts about the client's sincerity. The time of filing is the
crucial point in sanctions cases.'" Absent actual knowledge that the
client is committing perjury, bringing an action without any basis, or
abusing the system, the attorney cannot judge the client or the cli-
ent's motives in the case. To do so would be to risk malpractice, a
grievance, or both.
Because the sanction rules require the attorney to judge the
credibility of the client, evidence, and witnesses in advance of the
litigation (and in the case of Federal Rule 11, in advance of the
pleadings), the attorney must play three roles: zealous advocate, of-
ficer of the court, and unwilling trier of fact and credibility. If the
attorney fails to measure up to the applicable standards in any of
these areas, the result may be a malpractice suit, disbarment, sanc-
tions, or a combination thereof. Although the Needle court suggested
that sanctions would be warranted only when the attorney's conduct
is intentional, courts award sanctions for conduct that is less than
purely intentional.
Very few cases satisfy the real intent of the sanction rules, but
the attempt to control these cases has radically altered the way at-
torneys approach the practice, the client, and the court. The conse-
quences are severe. In Needle, for example, the cost of appealing the
75. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 481, 568 A.2d 856, 865,
cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990) (quoting Talley v. Talley, 317 Md. 428, 564
A.2d 777 (1989)).
76. "[The] adversary system intends, and expects, lawyers to probe the outer limits of
the bounds of the law, ever searching for a more efficacious remedy. ... State Bar Griev-
ance Adm'r v. Corace, 390 Mich. 419, 434-35, 213 N.W.2d 124, 132 (1973).
77. Kelley v. Dowell, 81 Md. App. 338, 342, 567 A.2d 521, 523 (1990).
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trial court's imposition of sanctions matched the cost of the sanctions
that were ordered.78 Mr. Needle and his associate were vindicated,
but they paid the price nevertheless. The harm to practitioners and
to the practice of law will continue unabated until the rules are sup-
plemented by written, specific, and narrow guidelines.
D. Vagueness of the Sanction Rules
Further problems arise from the language of the sanction rules;
the language is often so vague as to make interpretation nearly im-
possible when the situation involves unintentional misconduct. The
interpretation of the rules often adds more confusion than clarity.79
This leads to other confusion. In Robinson v. National Cash Regis-
ter,80 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to con-
strue the language of Rule 11. The court suggested that there should
be a difference in the treatment of an attorney who signs pleadings
as opposed to one who does not.8 Therefore, the inquiry is not based
on the actions or conduct of the offending attorney or on the attor-
ney's degree of involvement. Instead, the sanction decision hinges on
whether the attorney's name appears on the dotted line. In Robin-
son, the court concluded that the absence of the attorney's signature
was determinative, even though evidence was presented to the court
that the attorney in question had been mentioned in the pleadings
and had participated in settlement negotiations.8 2 The court cited
public policy reasons for failing to sanction the attorney, but never
discussed the measure of conduct."8 The court seemed to measure
the attorney's conduct by whether the attorney's signature was on a
pleading. This approach is not applied in malpractice cases or in dis-
cipline cases, in which the attorney's conduct would be decisive.
Unfortunately, the continued confusion regarding the function,
direction, and application of court-ordered sanctions makes it more
difficult to justify their existence. Whether the standard is bad faith
78. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
79. For example, in McLaughlin v. Bralee, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court
suggested that the amended Rule II requires the imposition of sanctions when "warranted by
groundless or abusive practices." Id. at 1205 (quoting Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168,
1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). It is not clear how this concept relates to the standards specifically set
out in Rule 1I. This illustrates the difficulty faced by courts in attempting to apply the rules
and to interpret them. Some troublesome areas are difficult to resolve but easy to recognize;
sanctionable conduct is neither.
80. 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 1128-29.
82. Id. at 1131-32. The court rejected the proposition that the attorney in question was
mentioned in the pleadings. Id. at 1132.
83. Id. at 1132.
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or reasonable inquiry, the clear purpose of the sanction process is to
measure and punish offending conduct. This becomes clear when
courts suggest, as the court did in Napier v. Thirty or More Uniden-
tified Federal Agents, Employes or Officersa" that Rule 11 imposes a
duty that requires an attorney to inquire into the facts and law
before filing papers with the court.8
Moreover, the rules fail to indicate when the lawyer is supposed
to make this crucial decision upon which the sanction process hinges.
The crucial point appears to be the moment when the attorney
agrees to file the case on behalf of the client. Once the case is filed,
however, the attorney must follow the matter through discovery, un-
less there is evidence that would lead the reasonable attorney to be-
lieve that the case is being brought "vexatiously, wantonly or for
oppressive reasons. ' 8  Once discovery is complete, appropriate mo-
tions are filed, and the case is set for trial, the attorney may still
judge the client's case and determine whether the case will go for-
ward.87 A lawyer may also refuse to take a case because the fee will
be inadequate, the case will create a conflict of interest, the client is
unwilling to be truthful, or the evidence fails to justify the claim.
Under the sanction rules, however, an attorney must decide whether
to accept the case based almost entirely on his or her personal evalu-
ation of whether the case is frivolous and that decision is made with-
out the benefit of evidence, testimony, or response from the opposing
counsel. The judgment of the judge is thereby replaced with the
judgment of the attorney.
These rules are nebulous and unclear, and do not adequately
allow the attorney to zealously and effectively represent the client.
The client must confront another hurdle in the process of obtaining a
legal remedy. Unlike other hurdles that are the subject of clear rules
of procedure, this hurdle is based on the subject judgment of the
attorney or, ultimately, the judge. For example, the level of the de-
mand for damages formulated by the attorney may be the subject of
sanctions.88
84. 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 1091.
86. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
87. Many courts take the view that the attorney has the obligation to dismiss a lawsuit
that he or she believes to be baseless, irrespective of the potential outcome, simply because
lawyers are officers of the court and their primary duty is to help administer justice. Conse-
quently, the attorney's duty to the court takes precedence over the duty to the client. In re
Custody of Caruso, 185 Ill. App. 3d 739, , 542 N.E.2d 375, 379, appeal denied, 545
N.E.2d 135 (III. 1989) (quoting Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248,
1251 (D. Minn. 1984)).
88. See, e.g., Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 827 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1987) (frivolous
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This becomes particularly troublesome when the client is at-
tempting to assert a fundamental right. In Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v.
Bishop's Garth Associates Limited Partnership,89 the court sug-
gested that when a fundamental right is involved, the court must
exercise care, particularly when the attorney's conduct is based on
justifiable grounds.90 This implies a different level of review when a
fundamental right is involved than in ordinary litigation situations.91
Nevertheless, the client must be aware that the jury is not the only
arbiter of the case. The client must satisfy the attorney in order to
obtain legal vindication, and may even have to confront the judge's
personal view of the case.92
E. Other Problems
The penalties for violating the vague sanction rules are exten-
sive and costly.9s One frequently applied remedy is the award of at-
torney's fees to the opposing side. 4 Courts may utilize other reme-
dies, however, such as awarding the costs of litigation,95 or issuing
warnings, oral reprimands, or written admonitions. The court may
even order the offending attorney to take continuing education
courses.96 One court ordered the sanctioned attorney to circulate the
court's opinion criticizing his conduct throughout his firm. 7 Never-
theless, the selection of an appropriate remedy is the very least of the
problems associated with the sanction rules, paling into insignifi-
cance when compared to the interpretational problems.
Finally, perhaps the most disturbing problem with the rules is
damage claim warranted sanctions).
89. 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175, cert. denied, 313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988).
90. Id. at 221, 540 A.2d at 1178.
91. Id.
92. In Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985), the
court suggested that the attorney had two duties: "to counsel the client against bringing merit-
less claims, and to conduct reasonable inquiry before instituting suit. ... Id. at 261. In
most sanctions cases, however, even if the attorney carries out both duties, counsel and client
might still be subject to sanctions because there is no accurate and clear way of determining
when a claim is meritless and what level of inquiry is reasonable.
93. This is despite cases. suggesting that the sanction to be chosen should be the "least
severe sanction adequate to serve the purpose." Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d
866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988).
94. Needle v. White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856, cert.
denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990). See also Larouche v. National Broadcasting Co.,
780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986).
95. In re Custody of Caruso, 185 Ill. App. 3d 739, 542 N.E.2d 375, appeal denied, 545
N.E.2d 135 (Il1. 1989).
96. Stevens v. City of Brookton, 676 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1987).
97. Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519
(N.D. Cal. 1984), af'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the difference between their philosophical focus and their real focus.
Philosophically, the rules seek to attack cases that do not deserve to
be in court because they do not warrant judicial attention. In reality,
however, every case is affected by the sanction rules, because the
sanctions sword hangs over the head of both counsel and client98 and
because the judge is given a power so enormous that it destroys the
natural balance of the legal system.99
The state and federal sanction rules are unclear, and produce
more litigation, not less. 100 The deterrent effect is offset by the num-
ber of appeals generated by the application or misapplication of the
sanctions rules caused by the lack of clarity in the rules. In short, if
the judge simply dismissed the frivolous case on the merits, the net
result would probably be a significant reduction in the number of
cases and appeals. Even a reduction in the number of appeals would
be welcome and would significantly benefit those litigants whose
cases languish on appellate court dockets.
98. Concern that partners in a sanctioned attorney's law firm might be liable along with
the offender was recently assuaged by the Supreme Court in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989). The Court reversed a Second Circuit decision
that upheld an award of $50,000 against a New York attorney and $50,000 against his former
firm for the attorney's filings in a copyright infringement action. Id. at 457-58. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that an award of sanctions against the lawyer and
his firm would serve as a deterrent. Id. at 459-60. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice
Scalia noted that the text of the rule referred to the person who signed the paper; this meant
an individual signer, not the firm. Id. at 458-59. In dissent, Justice Marshall suggested that the
majority opinion would give a blanket immunity to law firms for the misconduct of their indi-
vidual partners. Id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. In Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff filed an action to
assert certain constitutional rights. Id. at 464. The plaintiff filed suit to prevent the running of
the statute of limitations, and voluntarily dismissed the case after a brief oral argument on a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 465. The court found that the conduct of the plaintiffs counsel bor-
dered on violating Rule 11, but denied a motion for sanctions. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that counsel had clearly violated Rule
II because there was no indication that counsel ever intended to seek a modification of existing
law. Id. at 466. However, the dissent noted that the plaintiff's attorney reasonably believed
that facts existed which supported a claim that constitutional rights had been violated. Cabell,
810 F.2d at 467-68.
This case highlights the argument that ethical codes are remiss in obligating the lawyer to
direct his or her efforts to satisfying the desires of the client, without indicating clear obliga-
tions to other institutions. Patterson, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Rele-
vance and Role of the Client, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 43, 50-52, 60-63 (1987). Regardless of
the accuracy of Patterson's thesis, court-ordered sanctions clearly raise difficult issues concern-
ing the attorney's exercise of totally independent judgment about the forward movement of a
case that may be on the edge of the law. Some might suggest that the sanction rules have
succeeded if they have done nothing more than require attorneys to think about their obliga-
tions to the judicial system.
100. Sanctions are applied equally to appeals that a court determines to be frivolous.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Economou, No. C006703 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1990) (LEXIS,
States library, Cal. file) (court determined that appeal was frivolous and a misuse of an appel-
late court's resources).
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III. Due Process Concerns
Even if the rules were more clearly drafted and their terms
more clearly defined, a critical problem would still remain: the lack
of concern for procedural due process that frequently appears in at-
torney sanction cases. Neither the state rules nor Federal Rule 11
provide any procedural safeguards. 10 1 Both the state and federal
courts treat the sanction rules as nothing more than extensions of the
judge's general power to rule on motions. This treatment is not justi-
fied. These sanctions have the same impact as those associated with
the state attorney discipline procedures, and are qualitatively no dif-
ferent. The lawyer who is the subject of court-ordered sanctions is
often scrutinized and ridiculed by members of the profession, the
public, and the press. Many people, attorneys and laymen alike, be-
lieve that many frivolous cases are brought and that the sanction
rules will somehow reduce this number. Accordingly, the sanctioned
attorney is tried and sentenced in the court of public opinion, suffer-
ing the further stigma of being judged as unprofessional by the
press, the public, and the bar.
A. Due Process and the Judge
In most situations, sanction awards violate even the most rudi-
mentary definition of the concept of due process. 102 Neither state nor
federal sanction rules require the holding of a hearing, gathering of
facts, rendering of a formal opinion, presentation of evidence or wit-
nesses, or confrontation of witnesses. 0 " The judge, by raising the
sanction issue sua sponte or by recognizing a motion from opposing
counsel, assumes the simultaneous roles of prosecutor and judge. The
101. See supra notes 34-35.
102.
Due process of law. Law in its regular course of administration through courts of
justice. Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the
powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and
under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims
prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs . . . . To
give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its
constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject matter
of the suit . . . Due process of law implies the right of the person affected
thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the
question of life, liberty or property, in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard,
by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every
material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved. If any
question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against him, this is not due
process of law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (5th ed. 1979).
103. See supra notes 34-35 for sanction rules.
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judge's rulings narrow the options available to the accused lawyer,
and the judge will make the sanction decision without affording any
guarantees or protection to the accused attorney.
The role of the judge is even more troublesome because it is
inextricably linked to the lack of clarity in the rules themselves. To
allow one person to decide in each case what is a "reasonable in-
quiry ' 10 4 or what is "bad faith"10 5 returns the litigation process to a
subjective level. A judge, who is far removed from the practice of
law and may not see the larger context, may find perfectly sound
legal tactics to be frivolous or unreasonable. The judge may also
view creative tactics as a threat to the court and the litigation pro-
cess. Sanction rules allow the judge to punish the lawyer when legiti-
mate differences of opinion exist, and the only remedy for the lawyer
is a costly and time-consuming appeal.
A scenario drawn from actual practice illustrates this problem.
Near the end of the discovery period, an attorney filed interrogato-
ries. Opposing counsel complained that the purpose was purely to
harass; the lawyer responded that he had a right under local rules to
file the interrogatories and to have them answered within thirty days.
He stated that he wanted the record complete and that there might
be information to which he was entitled. The judge believed discov-
ery had been quite thorough and lengthy. Should the judge be al-
lowed to sanction the lawyer who filed the interrogatories by substi-
tuting his judgment as to their value for that of the lawyer? 0 "
Some motions may appear frivolous, but may in fact be appro-
priately filed in an effort to obtain a favorable response on behalf of
the client. No justification exists for permitting the judge, who must
consider the merits of the case, to simultaneously evaluate the valid-
ity of an attorney's tactics. In order to avoid sanctions, the attorney
may be required to reveal the litigation strategy in court, thereby
giving a significant advantage to opposing counsel. This process ben-
efits nobody, and deprives the legal system of the opportunity to
evaluate and experiment with creative solutions to legal issues.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. II.
105. MD. R. Civ. P. 1-341.
106. This occurred in a case arising under Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration Stat-
ute, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05 (1989). The author served as Panel Chair
in the case, and was therefore responsible for ruling on all motions and questions of evidence
and procedure. Although extensive discovery had taken place, I denied the motion for sanc-
tions on the ground that the lawyer had a right to file the interrogatories and was exercising
the right in a timely fashion. Although bad feelings clearly existed between this attorney and
his adversary, I felt it inappropriate to substitute my judgment and to conclude that the attor-
ney had acted in bad faith or without substantial justification.
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B. The Need for Due Process
The failure of the sanction rules to provide for due process is
particularly striking in light of the requirements of due process im-
posed upon the attorney disciplinary system. In In re Ruffalo,10 7 the
United States Supreme Court held that attorneys charged with un-
ethical conduct are entitled to procedural due process including fair
notice of the charge.108 State courts have extended the requirements
of due process to administrative hearings before bar grievance com-
missions. 109 Due process requirements should also be extended to the
sanction process because sanctions are designed to punish the attor-
ney for conduct that the court finds to be violative of appropriate
standards of conduct.' 10 When a judge sanctions an attorney, the ec-
onomic, personal, and professional consequences are substantially
similar to those arising when sanctions are imposed through the
grievance process. These consequences may limit or even end the at-
torney's ability to practice law. Court-ordered sanctions may deprive
the attorney of the privilege of practice, which should not occur
without due process of law."'
In Braley v. Campbell,"2 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit confronted the due process question in a sanctions case."'
Alexander, the plaintiffs attorney, filed a civil rights action against a
municipal hospital and other defendants."" At trial, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants." 5 Alexander
appealed, but his arguments, like those he raised during the trial,
107. 390 U.S. 544 (1975).
108. Id. at 550. The Court concluded that a disciplinary proceeding is an adversary
proceeding of a quasi-criminal nature; therefore, the attorney is entitled to due process. Id. at
551-52.
109. Sexton v. Arkansas Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 299 Ark. 439,
774 S.W.2d 114 (1989).
110. "The recognized purposes to be achieved by lawyer discipline are to protect the
public, ensure the administration of justice, and maintain the integrity of the [legal] profes-
sion." In re Bowen, 160 Ariz. 558, -, 774 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1989). See also In re Hoover,
161 Ariz. 529, 779 P.2d 1268 (1989).
111. Sexton v. Arkansas Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 299 Ark. 439,
, 774 S.W.2d 114, 118 (1989) ("Certainly, we could never tolerate the denial of the right
to practice law without fully affording due process to the practicing attorney.").
112. 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987).
113. The court imposed sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982), which states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably or vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy person-
ally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct.
Under Rule 1I, the trial court alone is empowered to impose sanctions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
114. Braley, 832 F.2d at 1508.
115. Id.
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were so convoluted that the defendants had great difficulty under-
standing the plaintiff's basic contentions.116 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment and awarded
the defendants attorney's fees and costs for the appeal, on the
grounds that it was "patently frivolous, multiplicious and vexa-
tious.""' The court affirmed the judgment en banc, and addressed
what process is due in court-ordered sanction cases:
[T]he court must identify the extent of the multiplicity resulting
from the attorney's behavior and the costs arising therefrom.
Second, because the person sanctioned is entitled to notice and
opportunity to be heard, the objectionable conduct must be iden-
tified sufficiently to make the 'opportunity to respond meaning-
ful. Finally, the reasons for the decision must be in a form re-
viewable by the appellate courts."'
Fundamental due process must be provided in any attorney sanction
procedure. Although the Braley court set forth some procedural re-
quirements, it failed to explain how these requirements are to be
satisfied.
C. Due Process and Judicial Discretion
A Minnesota appellate case, Anderson v. Lindgren,"" illustrates
the essential due process problem raised by court-ordered sanctions:
the broad, unbridled discretion of the trial judge to impose harsh
sanctions. The plaintiff had opened a resort motel as a retirement
project.1 20 She fell behind in mortgage payments, however, and was
forced to close the motel after less than three years of operation.'
Anderson filed suit against several defendants, claiming $85,000 in
losses from the operation. 2 ' The trial court concluded that Ander-
son's claims were frivolous and brought in bad faith, and directed a
verdict in favor of all defendants. 2 3 The court ordered Anderson to
pay more than $20,000 in attorney's fees. 24
Anderson appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which
held that she lost her investment because the motel was unsuccessful,
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1507.
118. Id. at 1513.
119. 360 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
120. Id. at 350.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 352.
124. Anderson v. Lindgren, 360 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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and not due to any conduct attributable to the defendants.125 The
court also held that the inappropriate behavior of the plaintiff and
her attorney justified the trial court's finding of bad faith and its
award of sanctions.126 The court agreed with the trial court's charac-
terization of this judicial function as "frankly, distasteful."' 27 Since
the trial court did not act capriciously or abuse its broad discretion,
however, the appellate court did not overturn the award.2 8 The
court unequivocally noted its disapproval of the sanctions: "[w]e do
not endorse the award as the only, or even as the most appropriate,
method by which to deal with recalcitrant parties or counsel. Courts
have at their disposal less intrusive sanctions and cautions which
should be explored and exhausted before resorting to an award of
attorneys fees.'1
2 9
This case suggests that it is very difficult for the trial judge to
make the sanction decision objectively. After hearing the evidence,
judging the credibility of the witnesses, and directing a verdict in
favor of the defendants, the trial judge could never have been objec-
tive and fair in imposing sanctions. The court never held a hearing to
determine whether the plaintiff and her attorney acted in bad faith.
This issue was left entirely to the discretion of the trial judge.
Whether the plaintiff and her attorney acted in bad faith or not,
they were clearly entitled to fundamental due process and fairness.
Parties facing court-ordered sanctions are entitled to have their ac-
tions evaluated by an impartial judge. This protection is absolutely
crucial because the sanction determination will be reversed only if
the judge is guilty of abuse of discretion.130
It is far from clear that justice was served by imposing sanctions
on Anderson and her attorney, particularly when these sanctions led
to extensive satellite litigation. The court could have resolved the
matter by simply dismissing the case and filing a grievance with the
office of bar counsel. Perhaps justice was served by assuring the in-
nocent victims of a frivolous lawsuit that they would be compensated
for their attorneys fees. This positive result is mitigated, however, by
125. Id.
126. Id. at 353.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Anderson v. Lindgren, 360 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
130. Id. But see In re Lasky, 54, Wash. App. 841, 776 P.2d 695 (1989), in which the
court noted that some courts have adopted a three-tier approach for review of sanction deter-
minations: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo; and the appropriateness of the sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 551,
776 P.2d at 700. The Lasky court chose to use the normal abuse of discretion standard. Id. at
551-52, 776 P.2d at 700.
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the high cost of answering to the appeal. In light of the overall dam-
age to the judicial system, fee awards seem counterproductive. The
judicial system is diminished when the system allows an attorney to
be punished for bringing a losing case. Furthermore, fundamental
principles of due process are violated when sanctions are imposed by
the judge who heard the underlying case 131 and without an appropri-
ate factfinding hearing. The judicial system cannot justify a proce-
dure that denies due process, 3 2 objectivity, and fundamental fair-
ness, and which stifles the creativity that has traditionally been the
hallmark of our legal system.
Even when the attorney files a suit with no basis in fact, due
process demands that sanctions be imposed only after an appropriate
hearing in which all facts and issues are explored. Unless this oppor-
tunity to be heard is provided, the attorney's only remedy is to file an
appeal that can succeed only if the reviewing court finds that the
lower court abused its discretion. 33
If a trial judge may impose sanctions without conducting a sep-
arate hearing,134 without appointing a separate judge to hear the
131. See In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317 (Del. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205
(1984). When a member of the grievance board acts in an adjudicative or investigative -role in
one proceeding and in a judicial role in another involving different facts, there is no violation
of due process. 472 A.2d at 1327-28 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)). This
case, however, involved no additional evidence of unfairness in the grievance process, and the
underlying cases involved different facts. 472 A.2d at 1328.
132. See Beit v. Probate & Family Court Dep't, 385 Mass. 854, 434 N.E.2d 642
(1982), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that fair notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing must be provided before a judge can impose costs on an attorney for
failure to appear. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 647. The judge relied on his inherent power, and
not on any statutory authority. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 643-44. The Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that the judge did possess the power to sanction the attorney, but added that
if the judge requires an attorney to pay court costs, he must afford him fair
notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Without procedural safeguards,
"serious due process problems would result were trial courts to use their inherent
power in lieu of the contempt power." ... Further, we believe that a judge who
exercises his or her inherent power to impose costs on an attorney must articu-
late the reasons for the sanction. The requirement of articulation of reasons en-
sures that the judge will act with restraint. We also believe that it ensures judi-
cial recognition of the seriousness of imposing sanctions.
Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 646-47 (quoting Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 638, 150 Cal.
Rtpr. 461, 468 (1978)).
The court added two interesting observations. First, the court noted the suggestion made
by one commentator that the attorney be required to notify the client of the sanction so the
client may guard against being billed by the attorney for the cost of the sanction. Id. at -
n.4, 434 N.E.2d 643 n.4 (citing Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 802 (1981)).
Second, the court suggested that the judge might refer the case to the appropriate griev-
ance authority, rather than impose sanctions. 385 Mass. at - n.13, 434 N.E.2d at 647 n.13.
133. Kilton v. Nadler & Assocs., 447 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). But see
discussion of In re Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 776 P.2d 695 (1989), supra note 130.
134. See, e.g., Van Eps v. Johnson, 150 Vt. 324, -, 553 A.2d 1089, 1092 (1988)
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case, and without following final and meaningful guidelines, funda-
mental notions of due process and fairness will be violated. Neither
the lofty rationale behind court-ordered sanctions nor the reprehensi-
ble conduct of some attorneys and their clients can justify the abro-
gation of fundamental rights 35 and abandonment of due process. If
courts cannot be just and fair in imposing sanctions, they will inevi-
tably shatter the image of integrity that gives public legitimacy to
the judicial process.
IV. Advantages of Traditional Disciplinary Procedures
A. The Attorney Disciplinary Procedure
The attorney disciplinary procedure exists to protect the public,
ensure that justice will be administered, and maintain the integrity
of the profession.13 When a violation of ethical standards occurs, the
state bar has the power to disbar the errant attorney. 3 7 This power
stems from the court's general authority to define, regulate, and con-
trol the practice of law."3 8 This includes the power to develop stan-
dards by which attorney conduct shall be measured.139
This disciplinary process is utilized and is effective. Between
1984 and 1988, more than 11,000 attorneys were subjected to some
degree of discipline.'40 Of that number, more than 1200 were dis-
barred and more than 3500 were suspended from the practice of
law."4' During the same period, more than 3200 attorneys were dis-
ciplined by federal agencies. 42 Of that number, 250 were disbarred
and more than 340 were suspended."' 3 Significantly, these discipli-
nary procedures are separate from the litigation arena, take their
inspiration from established codes of conduct, and operate according
to procedural standards designed to provide fundamental due process
while simultaneously protecting the interests of the profession and
(absence of notice and an appropriate and fair hearing was improper, especially when such a
hearing might shed light on the measure of damages to be imposed as a sanction).
135. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987); Sanko Steamship
Co., Ltd v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1987).
136. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
137. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 275, 280 (La. 1989).
138. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325, 334 (W. Va. 1988).
139. Id.
140. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
AND CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATISTICAL REPORT, SANCTIONS IMPOSED
IN PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS 1984-1988 25 (1989).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id.
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the public.' 44 The process of determining sanctions and attorney dis-
cipline under the grievance procedure can run in a parallel fashion
against the same attorney.
145
If the court-ordered sanction process conformed to the require-
ments of due process and fundamental fairness, the sanction system
would be nothing more than a carbon copy of the attorney discipli-
nary system already in place. No perceptible differences would exist
to justify its separate operation. Administrative agencies, such as
state bar grievance committees, already exist, operating under estab-
lished rules designed to protect attorneys from premature public at-
tack and to provide appropriate factfinding procedures consistent
with due process of law.1
46
B. Model Rule 3.1
Some criticize the ethical codes as not aspiring high enough.
Some complain that the code is preoccupied with the attorney-client
relationship, and not sufficiently concerned with the attorney's duties
to others. Some contend that the emphasis on zealous representation
leads to a low standard of attorney conduct."17 Professor Patterson
suggests that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct" 8 represent a
positive change in approach from a "loyalty code" to an "integrity
code."1 91 He argues that the Rules set more objective and extrinsic
requirements regarding appropriate conduct by members of the
bar. 5
0
The Model Rules clearly address the same problems that Rule
11 is designed to prevent. Model Rule 3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in
a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless
144. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STAN-
DARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 5-6 (1986).
145. In re Solerwitz, 575 A.2d 287, 292 (D.C. App. 1990).
146. In re Petition of Colorado Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, - , 325 P.2d 932, 937
(1958).
147. Patterson, supra note 99, at 46-47.
148. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar As-
sociation House of Delegates on August 2, 1983, following extensive research, review, and
study by the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
chaired by the late Robert J. Kutak. Id. at 43.
149. Id. at 48-49.
150. Id.
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so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
1 51
The Comment to Rule 3.1 indicates that a lawyer has a duty "to use
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a
duty not to abuse legal procedure."' 15 This Comment emphasizes the
law's flexibility and the potential for change, 153 whereas sanction
rules seek to restrict innovation and creativity.
The Comment also recognizes that the law is often unclear and
is never static. 54 The lawyer does not always have full information
at hand when the time comes to sign the pleading or commence the
suit. 155 Gaining that information is a principle goal of the liberal
discovery process.' 56 The Model Rules recognize that the system
must allow the attorney some latitude to pursue the vindication of
the client's position, even if the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client will lose the case.5 7 Critically, Model Rule 3.1 differs from
Rule 11 on the issue of intent. Under the Model Rules, the attorney
may be disciplined only if the client brings the action primarily for
the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another, or if the
attorney cannot make a good faith argument for extending, modify-
ing, or reversing the law.
15 8
C. Advantages of the Traditional Approach
Model Rule 3.1 clearly emanates from a different philosophical
approach than the approach that produced Rule 11 and its various
state counterparts. The sanction rules impose unrealistic and burden-
some standards, and have a chilling effect on litigation. Sanction
rules create a two-step process that first inquires into the minds of
the client and lawyer, and then examines the merits of the case. Al-
though the court handles both stages simultaneously, the attorney
must act as both judge and advocate, and must assume these roles
before any meaningful discovery occurs.
Some state sanction rules parallel the language and intent of
Model Rule 3.1.159 In Kahn v. Cundiff,'" the lawyer attempted to
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1989).
152. Id. comment.
153. Id. comment.





159. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-32-1 (Burns 1986), which provides:
(b) In any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees as part of the
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utilize Model Rule 3.1 to explain the meaning of the term frivolous,
which appears in the Indiana sanction rule.' 6' The court concluded
that the statute established an objective standard of reasonableness,
which considered the opportunity the attorney had to investigate the
facts and conduct discovery prior to making the decision to move
forward with the case.
162
Model Rule 3.1 provides a more thoughtful and viable method
of dealing with frivolous cases than either Federal Rule 11 or the
state sanction rules. Model Rule 3.1 is coordinated with the attor-
ney's other ethical obligations, including those to the client, the pro-
fession, and the court, allowing these obligations to be considered in
context. For example, issues of confidentiality or conflict of interest
may exist that must be considered in evaluating the conduct of an
attorney. Because administrative grievance proceedings are confiden-
tial, a court may not be aware of an attorney's previous ethical
lapses when evaluating the attorney's conduct under Rule 11. Most
significantly, the sanctioned attorney is not subject to the whim of
the judge but is afforded specific due process protection.
In re Belue163 illustrates how administrative disciplinary pro-
ceedings can effectively redress grievances without compromising an
attorney's due process rights. Belue was charged with thirteen counts
of unethical behavior, including violations of Model Rule 3.1."'
Belue contended that he was merely an aggressive advocate and that
the charges against him represented vigilanteeism.16 5 Despite Belue's
contention, the case demonstrates the existence of an established
procedure that allowed the grievance committee to act with propri-
ety and dignity in dealing with what was a difficult and emotional
case. The grievance committee held a two and one-half day hearing,
after which the committee made detailed findings of fact and recom-
mendations. 66 The Montana Supreme Court unanimously accepted
cost to the prevailing party, if it finds that either party:
(I) Brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivo-
lous, unreasonable or groundless;
(2) Continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim
or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable or groundless; or
(3) Litigated the action in bad faith.
See also PA. R. Civ. P. 4019.
160. 533 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), affid, 543 N.E.2d 627 (Ind. 1989).
161. 553 N.E.2d at 170.
162. Id.
163. 232 Mont. 365, 766 P.2d 206 (1988).
164. Id. at - , 766 P.2d at 208. Ironically, Belue was charged with violating Rule 3.1
because he filed frivolous and unfounded ethical claims against opposing counsel. Id.
165. Id. at __, 766 P.2d at 212.
166. Id. at -, 766 P.2d at 206.
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those recommendations and suspended Belue from the practice of
law for three months.'67 Both the public and the legal community
benefit from the calm approach of such a bar grievance procedure.' 68
In re Plunkett'6" further illustrates the point. Minnesota's Di-
rector of Lawyers Professional Responsibility petitioned the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, alleging unethical conduct by Plunkett, includ-
ing a violation of Rule 3.1.17° The Minnesota Supreme Court viewed
Plunkett's conduct in light of his other ethical obligations,17' and dis-
ciplined Plunkett by publicly reprimanding him and ordering him to
pay the costs of the frivolous proceeding. 12 Court-ordered sanctions
would not have better served the interests of the public, the legal
system, or the opposing party. The sanctions process would have re-
solved the matter more quickly and the opposing party would have
received attorneys fees. The grievance process provided a more com-
plete resolution, however, by considering all aspects of Plunkett's
conduct and establishing clear guidelines for attorneys to follow in
the future.
Moreover, use of the established grievance procedure enhances
the profession and maintains the balance between the attorney and
the court. Model Rule 3.1 respects the needs of the legal system, but
also acknowledges that citizens need to seek judicial resolution of
their legal problems. 73 The Model Rules respect the needs and obli-
gations of all participants in the legal system. 74 Sua sponte disci-
pline by judges tips the balance in favor of the judge and, while it
accomplishes the immediate goal of punishment, subjects the system
to further satellite litigation. 75
167. Id. at - , 766 P.2d at 212.
168. See Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Nisbet, No. Bar-88-18 (Me. June 29, 1989)
(LEXIS, States library, Me. file).
169. 432 N.W.2d 454 (Minn. 1988).
170. Id. at 455. Plunkett was charged with initiating a lawsuit in retaliation for a
human rights claim against his clients. Id.
171. Id. For example, the court considered Plunkett's obligation to supervise his associ-
ate, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1989), and his duty to respect
the rights of others, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1989).
172. Plunkett, 432 N.W.2d at 455.
173. Quoting the comment to Model Rule 3.1, Chief Judge Richard Gilbert of the Ma-
ryland Court of Special Appeals recently pointed out that an action is "not frivolous even
though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail." Legal Aid
Bureau, Inc. v. Bishop's Garth Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 75 Md. App. 214, 222, 540 A.2d
1175, 1179, cert. denied, 313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988).
174. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325, 326 (W. Va. 1988)
(when faced with the choice between proceeding under the grievance procedure and imposing
sanctions, courts should recognize that fairness, due process, and justice demand application of
the grievance procedure).
175. In Hauswald Baker v. Pantry Pride, 78 Md. App. 495, 552 A.2d 1308 (1989) the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated:
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The concept of balance is crucial to our legal system, and it
provides the final and most important reason for application of state
grievance procedures. The Preamble to the Model Rules outlines the
various duties and obligations of the attorney,176 and is animated by
a spirit of balance among the various actors in the legal system.17
The legal profession essentially governs itself,178 writing its own
rules of conduct, determining its own disciplinary standards, issuing
ethics opinions, and maintaining its own grievance process. This pro-
tects the systemic balance and gives the lawyer the power and au-
thority to challenge institutions when the challenge is justified. This
power should not be abrogated merely because some would abuse the
legal system.
The judge possesses enormous power to control the course of
litigation, in spite of claims that this power has diminished in recent
years. The legal profession has lost power, as evidenced by the move
in some jurisdictions to an elective judiciary. Although the sanction
rules are well-motivated, allowing judges and lawyers 1 79 to threaten
sanctions further diminishes the power of the legal profession. The
judge recognizes the power to impose sanctions and acts accordingly.
Attorneys recognize that they may be sanctioned, and they also act
accordingly.
V. Conclusion
Cases are brought in bad faith, without substantial justification,
and without appropriate and reasonable investigation. This reality
cannot be denied or ignored. Some lawyers lack integrity. Lawyers
and clients abuse the judicial system by filing motions and pleadings
that have no purpose other than vexation and harassment. Perhaps
there are too many lawyers chasing after too few cases in an overly
crowded judical system. Perhaps our society is overly litigious. Per-
haps lawyers overstep the ethical boundaries because they fear that
failure to get results for the client will lead to a malpractice action.
We find equally distressing a growing tendency on the part of some lawyers to
file a motion under Rule 1-341 [Maryland's sanction rule] almost routinely, as a
Pavlovian response to whatever the other side does. We would caution those
heading in that direction that the frivolous and unjustified filing of any motion,
including one under Md. Rule 1-341, may not only be grounds for sanctions
under that Rule but may also constitute a violation of Rule 3.1 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Id. at 507-08 n.3, 553 A.2d at 1314 n.3.
176. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1989).
177. See id.
178. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1989).
179. See Hauswald Bakery v. Pantry Pride, 78 Md. App. 495, 553 A.2d 1308 (1989).
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The problem demands reasonable and appropriate solutions.
Unfortunately, court-ordered sanctions represent a poor ap-
proach, providing a quick fix while trampling the rights of attorneys
and clients. Court-ordered sanctions have created more problems
than they have solved. The sanction rules are complex, and their
meanings are often unclear. They ignore due process, create tension
between attorneys and judges, and have a chilling effect on litiga-
tion. Finally, the sanctions rules create a new and unnecessary disci-
plinary process that is vastly inferior to the traditionally established
procedure.
Designed to stem the flow of litigation, sanction rules have be-
come the focus of a new flood.180 Appeal is the only remedy to a
sanctioned attorney or client; thus, sanction rules create an entirely
new class of appellate litigation. 18' This further congests appellate
dockets, and imposes extreme costs on those who seek appellate vin-
dication. The attorney faces a Hobson's choice: accept the sanction
and the consequent loss of professional standing and reputation, or
challenge the sanction and pay the cost of that challenge, knowing
that vindication may not result.
More important, the sanction process is fundamentally unfair,
unjust, and abusive. The rules do not require a hearing. They do not
establish the most basic due process protections. Moreover, the per-
son who hears the case, rules on the evidence, judges the credibility
of witnesses, instructs the jury, and rules on motions also determines
whether sanctions should be imposed. Some might argue that this is
a sensible approach, because the judge knows a great deal about the
case. This knowledge of the proceedings, litigants, and counsel, how-
ever, creates a real and present risk that the sanction process would
not be objective. Additionally, the sanctions process invests the judge
with the powers of the grand jury, trier of fact, and trier of the law.
The judge plays so many roles in this process that it is difficult to
determine which role is being played at any given moment.
The sanction rules unnecessary duplicate the traditional attor-
ney discipline procedures. These procedures take into account the in-
terests of all participants in the legal system. 82 The grievance pro-
180. See Szabo v. Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir.
1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that sanction rules
have created their own "cottage industry").
181. The standard of review of a trial court decision varies from state to state; determin-
ing the standard and overcoming the burden further exacerbates the problem faced by the
sanctioned attorney. See Kelley v. Dowell, 81 Md. App. 338, 567 A.2d 521 (1990).
182. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1989) with FED.
R. Civ. P. 11.
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cess takes time, and does not satisfy the urge for quick justice, but it
works. The speed of the sanction system does not justify the failure
to afford due process to sanctioned parties. Quick justice does not
justify judges or attorneys who use the threat of sanctions to obtain
desired results. The grievance process rests on a foundation of deci-
sional law, ethical codes, and advisory opinions. The sanction process
rests on a few vague statutes and vast judicial discretion.
Utilization of court-ordered sanctions diminishes the value and
credibility of the grievance process. If courts can sanction attorneys
for bringing frivolous cases, perhaps the sanction rules should be
modified to allow judicial sanctions for other ethical violations, such
as romantic liaisons with clients, conflicts of interest, inappropriate
trial publicity, or unreasonable fees. This would certainly provide for
more efficient discipline. It would also devastate the legal system.
The time has come to return the function of attorney discipline
to the appropriate agencies. Otherwise, courts will soon be required
to sanction attorneys for filing sanction motions. If this issue is not
immediately considered, the profession, the courts, and the public
will face an ever-increasing spiral of sanctions and appeals. Such a
result would not benefit anyone. It certainly would not fulfill the
hopes of those who created the sanction rules.
